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Abstract—Occupational fraud affects many companies world-
wide causing them economic loss and liability issues towards their
customers and other involved entities. Detecting internal fraud in
a company requires significant effort and, unfortunately cannot
be entirely prevented. The internal auditors have to process a
huge amount of data produced by diverse systems, which are
in most cases in textual form, with little automated support. In
this paper, we exploit the advantages of information visualization
and present a system that aims to detect occupational fraud in
systems which involve a pair of entities (e.g., an employee and
a client) and periodic activity. The main visualization is based
on a spiral system on which the events are drawn appropriately
according to their time-stamp. Suspicious events are considered
those which appear along the same radius or on close radii of the
spiral. Before producing the visualization, the system ranks both
involved entities according to the specifications of the internal
auditor and generates a video file of the activity such that events
with strong evidence of fraud appear first in the video. The
system is also equipped with several different visualizations and
mechanisms in order to meet the requirements of an internal
fraud detection system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Occupational fraud represents a serious and continuous
threat for companies worldwide regardless of their size or
type, and may cause severe damage to the operation of a
company. Occupational or employee fraud can be defined as
the intentionally misuse or abuse of the resources of a company
by an employee that takes advantage of the employment
position for personal profit. Fraud cases that are considered as
occupational fraud include the following: (i) falsification of fi-
nancial statements, (ii) asset misappropriation, and (iii) bribery
or corruption of employees.
According to a recent survey of the Association of Certified
Fraud Examiners [1], fraud causes a 5% loss to companies’
revenues each year, which applied to the estimated 2011 Gross
World Product, leads to a potential global loss of more than
$3.5 trillion, while the median loss caused by the occupational
fraud in the survey was $140.000. Apart from the economic
loss, a company that is victim of fraud has to face many
other non-negligible consequences. Among them is the loss of
reputation towards its customers, employees, and other entities
(financial institutions, vendors, etc.), especially in cases where
the companies keep record of personal data and/or transactions.
For these reasons, the prevention and detection of fraud
within a company is of tremendous importance, but it remains
a problem of outstanding difficulty and requires severe internal
control. However, monitoring of companies’ anti-fraud control
systems is a time-consuming task that requires huge effort
since the log data generated by these systems are in textual
form and their amount is not easily manageable by the internal
auditors in daily basis not even in a weekly basis. Thus, the
detection of malicious events and the corresponding response
to them cannot be immediate.
Examining occupational fraud schemes in specific systems
in which an employee and a client are involved (e.g., billing,
membership renewal systems, etc) reveals that events that
occur in regular time basis may be indications of fraud. For in-
stance, in a billing system of a company, if a specific employee
appears to have a monthly activity towards an account of a
customer, this should be considered as a suspicious periodic
series of events that has to be further examined. These events
become more important in the case they occur before the
billing date of the client or outside the employee’s working
hours.
In this paper, we present a system that visualizes serial
data produced by business control systems in which a pair of
entities (e.g., employee-client) is involved. The main goal of
our system is to detect periodic patterns suggesting that an
employee possibly falsifies the invoices and/or the account of
a client. Figure 1 illustrates a snapshot of our system. The base
of our system is a spiral visualization on which the time-stamp
of each event is appropriately represented. The main advantage
of spiral visualizations is that potential periodic patterns can be
quickly identified since they appear along a radius or on close
radii of the spiral. Our system consists of several coordinated
visualization windows, each dedicated to a particular aspect
of audit data. The top-rightmost visualization of Figure 1
illustrates the total activity of employees and clients. The
middle panel at the right side of Figure 1 demonstrates the time
and the dates for each event related to a client using different
colors to identify access during specific time intervals of a
day. This visualization contributes to the quick identification
of events that appear outside the employees’ working hours or
on holidays, which may be indications of fraud. The bottom-
rightmost visualization is a least square plot where the y-axis
corresponds to the days of a month and which aims to detect
periodicity. In the case where the plotted line is “almost”
parallel to x-axis and the points are “close” to this line, this
implies that there exists a periodic pattern related to a day of
the month. There also exits an event-viewer (refer to panel #5
of Figure 1) that illustrates the initial input data and interacts
with the visualization.
The proposed system has been developed based on feed-
back provided by internal auditors a major Greek company.
The main obstacle reported while trying to detect occupational
fraud is the amount of data that is usually generated from more
than one business systems and has to be investigated manually
by writing and executing scripts. For this reason, we have tried
to develop a system that quickly detects periodic patterns in
Fig. 1. A snapshot of the interface of the system. Dates, usernames and actions are made anonymous for confidentiality reasons.
data and incorporates several of the common patterns that are
investigated by the auditors in order to detect occupational
fraud. In addition, since occupational fraud is a sensitive issue,
auditors have also emphasized the necessity to have a tool that
is able to quickly confirm or reject their suspicions about the
activity of an employee. The proposed system can also be used
for this purpose.
The system is user-oriented and the visualization can be
adapted appropriately such that it depicts the patterns that are
investigated by the auditor. The innovation of this tool is that
it aggregates the total activity of each employee and client and
ranks both of them according to specifications defined by the
internal auditor. Based on this ranking the system produces
a video file. Frames are ordered such that those with strong
evidence of fraud appear first in the video.
The system is also equipped with supplementary visualiza-
tions that provide information about the activity of the employ-
ees and clients. In order to meet the requirements of an internal
auditor, the system supports supplementary functionalities such
as filtering, export log mechanisms, storing, reloading and
post-processing of data. It provides also advanced graphic
functionality, including popup menus, printing capabilities,
custom zoom, fit-in window, selection, dragging and resizing
of objects.
This paper is structured as follows: Section III overviews
the detection procedure. In Section IV, we present the factors
based on which the system ranks the employees and the
clients. In Section V, we describe in detail the system and
the visualization features. In Section VI, we present a case-
study on real data from a Greek company. We conclude in
Section VII with open problems and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the last few years, much research effort has been
focused on the field of fraud detection and several diverse
approaches have been proposed. However, to the best of our
knowledge, there exist only few papers that deal exclusively
with occupational fraud detection. For this reason, in this
section, we mention research that tries to detect various types
of fraud. Most of the existing work makes use of data-mining
techniques. An overview of existing publications on data-
mining can be found in [2]–[5]. There exist also, several ap-
proaches that present relational data-mining techniques using
the graph structure that may be applied to fraud detection.
Among them, Eberle and Holder [6] presented a graph-based
anomaly detection approach in order to detect occupational
fraud in business transactions and processes. In their work, they
search for anomalous instances of structural patterns which are
hidden in data that represent entities, relationships and actions.
Pattern matching and graph-pattern matching approaches
have also been proposed for fraud detection and several
systems have been developed. We will name only a few. The
NASD Regulation Detection System (ADS) [7]–[9] monitors
trades and quotations in the Nasdaq stock market and tries to
detect patterns and practices of violative activity. The Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network AI System (FAIS) [10], [11] is
a system that detects money laundering in cash transaction
data. The Link Analysis Workbench (LAW) [12] is developed
to detect cases of terrorist and other criminal activity in noisy
and incomplete information. Luell [4] presented a system that
combines data-mining and graph-pattern matching techniques
in order to detect occupational fraud within a financial insti-
tution. Visual data mining has also, been applied for fraud
detection. Huang et al. [13] presented a framework of visual
analytics for stock market security using 3D-treemaps. Chang
et al. [14] presented “WireVis”, a system that uses interactive
visualization techniques in order to search for suspicious
financial transactions. Di Giacomo et al. [15] proposed a sys-
tem based on information visualization techniques to discover
financial crimes. Didimo et al. [16] developed a system that
supports the analyst with effective tools in order to discover
financial crimes, like money laundering and frauds. Didimo et
al. [17] presented VIS4AUI, a system that collects financial
information with regard to ongoing bank relationships and
high value transactions and tries to detect money laundering
cases. Stasko et al. [18] developed a visual analytic system
that facilitates analysts to examine reports and documents more
efficiently in order to identify potential embedded threats.
Regarding the identification of periodic patterns in serial
data, Carlis and Konstan [19] suggested an approach in which
serial attributes of data are represented along a spiral axis,
while periodic ones along the radii of the spiral. Weber et
al. [20] presented an approach which uses spirals to visualize
large sets of time-series data and reveals periodic structures. In
their approach, the time axis is represented by the spiral and
other features of the data are depicted by points, colors, bars
or lines. Bertini et al. [21] presented SpiralView, a tool that
visualizes on a spiral the distribution of network alarms over
time and helps revealing potential periodic patterns. Argyriou
and Symvonis [22] suggested visualization techniques based
on concentric circles which aim to quickly identify periodic
events in serial data in order to reveal occupational fraud.
Suntinger et al. [23] developed a visualization system that
represents events from event-based systems on a cylindrical
tunnel. The visualization detects several incidents, such as
particular patterns or irregularities that might affect business
performance. Regarding the visualization of time-series data
and the available techniques, an overview can be found in
[24]–[26].
As mentioned above, our system was developed under
the guidance of internal auditors of a major Greek company
and it is designed to meet their requirements during the
investigation of fraud cases. Their major requirement was to
design a system that reveals reoccurring activity between pairs
of employee-clients. For this reason, we have adopted the spiral
visualization that enables serial data visualization. However,
in contrast with the work of Bertini et al. [21] that used the
spiral in order to visualize events daily, the data-sets that we
had to process cover a much larger time interval and had to be
visualized simultaneously. This fact combined with the large
volume of the data-set had to be faced efficiently in order to
avoid cluttering the visualization. Also, unlike to the data-sets
used for financial crime detection where there exists a “hint”
on suspicious cases or transactions, in our data-sets, in most
of the cases, it is highly unlikely to have prior knowledge
on suspicious cases. Hence, it is difficult and maybe “risky”
to try to filter the data before producing the visualization.
This motivated us to design the ranking procedure in order to
distinguish suspicious cases that have to be further examined
and try to adapt it to the needs of the auditors. If compared
with other existing systems for financial crime detection or
employee fraud mentioned above, our system (i) produces a
video file containing activity of clients-employees according
to the time interval selected by the auditors, (ii) distinguishes
suspicious events based on the ranking factors selected by the
auditor and distributes them in the video frames such that they
are quickly identified, and (iii) supports multiple coordinated
views that facilitate the investigation and reveal the periodic
activity.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE DETECTION PROCEDURE
In this section, we present an overview of the fraud
detection procedure as supported by our system. The input
data consist of log files or sets of database records generated by
systems which involve pairs of entities (e.g., billing systems).
Each record may have been generated by a call between an
employee and a client, a transaction involving both entities,
etc. Hence, a record consists of a time-stamp, an employee,
a client and an action taken by the employee. Since the log
files of a company are usually generated by different control
systems that support different log mechanisms (e.g., databases,
files, etc), the input data are appropriately parsed and stored
in the database of the system. Then, the system ranks the
clients and the employees according to rules specified by
the auditor and creates a video with all the activity of a
client. By default, the ranking is calculated based on the entire
database, unless the auditor specifies a desired time-interval.
In the visualization, all potentially suspicious incidents are
detected and can be further investigated by the auditor, who
makes use of the system’s accompanied visualizations. Before
we proceed with the detailed description of the system, we
introduce some terminology necessary for the description of
the ranking procedure.
An event e involves a pair of employee-client and is defined
by a 4-tuple (t,u,c,a), where:
• t is the time-stamp of the occurrence of the event,
• u is the id of the employee,
• c is the id of the client,
• a is the action taken by the employee.
For a particular 4-tuple (t,u,c,a), we say that client c is related
to event e and is also related to employee u. For a client
c, an event-series Tc = {ec1,ec2, . . . ,} is a sequence of events
eci = (ti,ui,c,ai) related to client c. Note that such an event-
series consists of events which may involve more than one
employee.
IV. RANKING PROCEDURE DESCRIPTION
In general, the ranking of a client is based on several factors
such as the number of events close to the billing date, the
actions taken by the employees, and so on, which are described
in detail in Section IV-A. The ranking of employees is based
on the ranking of the clients that are related to a specific
employee. Note that, since a company may have thousands
of clients, in the ranking procedure we take into consideration
only the ones for which there exists an event generated by a
log mechanism (i.e., not all registered clients of the business
system of a company).
A. Client Ranking Function
In order to rank clients, the system analyzes the event-
series that correspond to each client based on factors defined
by the auditor. In the system, we have incorporated several of
the queries commonly used by internal auditors, while seeking
for occupational fraud.
Let N be the number of distinct factors considered in the
ranking calculation. Let also acf be the “performance” of client
c at factor f . According to the severity (low, medium, high) of
the corresponding event-series, acf equals to zero, one or two,
respectively. Ranking Rc of client c is defined as follows:
Rc =
N
∑
f=1
acf ·w f ,
where w f is the weight of importance for factor f .
The weights of factors w f , f = 1, . . . ,N are determined by
the auditor, who also specifies an ordering among them that
best fits to what he/she is seeking for. For instance, if the
auditor is interested in events that occur outside the employee’s
working hours, the corresponding factor should be ranked first,
which implies that the weight of the corresponding factor
should be greater than the weights of other factors supported by
the system. Given a factor ordering, weights w f , f = 1, . . . ,N
of the factors are calculated based on a formula proposed by
Stillwell et al. [27], as follows:
w f =
N − r f + 1
N
∑
j=1
(N − r j + 1)
,
where r f is the rank position of factor f in the factor ordering.
In the following, we describe the factors that are currently
supported by the system. For each of these factors, we define
three classes of clients according to the severity (low, medium,
high) of event-series Tc corresponding to client c. Then,
performance acf of client c on factor f is defined by the
following formula:
acf =
{ 2, Tc ∈ High Severity Class f or f actor f
1, Tc ∈ Medium Severity Class f or f actor f
0, Tc ∈ Low Severity Class f or f actor f
Note that the default values that define each of the above
classes and are described in the remainder of this section were
suggested by the auditors of the company according to their
requirements. However, they can be appropriately alternated,
if needed.
1) Distance from Billing Date: Experience on examining
occupational fraud schemes has shown that events related to
the same pair of employee-client that appear on a monthly
basis and before the billing date of a client’s invoice may be
strong indications of fraud. Given an event-series Tc corre-
sponding to client c, the system detects events whose time-
stamp is close to the billing date of client c. Based on the
number of such events, the system calculates the severity of
event-series Tc. In the case where the time-stamp of an event
occurs after the billing date of a particular month, we consider
this as an incident that concerns next month’s activity.
Let e be an arbitrary event and let te be its time-stamp. Let
also t ′e be the billing date that immediately follows te. Then,
the distance of event e from the billing date, denoted by de, is
defined by the number of days between te and t ′e.
Let D0c be the set of events which occur within distance of
three days from the billing date, i.e., D0c = {ec ∈ Tc : de ≤ 3}
and |D0c | its cardinality. Similarly, we define the set of events
which occur within distance greater than three and less than
seven days from the billing date, i.e., D1c = {ec ∈ Tc : 3 < de ≤
7} and the set of events D2c = {ec ∈ Tc : de > 7} with distance
more than seven days from the billing date. The end-points of
the above investigated time-intervals can be adjusted if desired,
by the auditor. The evaluation of the importance of this factor
is based on a classification of event-series Tc in one of the
following severity classes according to the number of events
occurred close to the billing date. More precisely, event-series
Tc related to client c, belongs to this class if:
High Severity Class: This class includes event-series with
severe indications of fraud for which it holds one of the
following:
• |D0c | ≥ 2: This implies that there exist at least two
events related to client c too close to the billing date.
To minimize false-positives, cases where there exists
only one event too close to the billing date are not
considered by the system of high-severity, since they
may have occurred by coincidence. However, they are
classified to a medium-severity class in order to be
further investigated.
• |D1c | ≥ 3: We included this case in high severity class,
since the specific event-series contains an “unusual”
number of events within distance of one week from
the billing date. Again, the system tries to minimize
false-positives by taking into consideration events that
occurred within the interval of (3,7] days from the
billing date at least three times.
• |D0c |+ |D1c | ≥ 2: In this case, the system takes into
consideration the total number of events occurred
within distance of one week from the billing date.
Medium Severity Class: In this class, we consider event-series
for which it holds one of the following:
• |D0c | = 1 or |D1c | = 1 or |D1c | = 2: These cases were
excluded from the high-severity class in order to
minimize false-positives. However, they have to be
investigated since these may imply that malicious
activity has just begun.
• |D2c |> thres, where thres is a threshold defined by the
auditor. By default, this value is 5. This implies that
there exists a continuous activity concerning client c,
which may have to be further investigated.
Low Severity Class: All other cases.
Similarly, one can define a factor regarding the due date
of the invoice of a client. Again, in this case we are interested
in events that occur before the due date. However, it is
recommended that the auditor does not use simultaneously the
“distance from billing date” factor and the “distance from due
date” factor, since there exist overlaps between the investigated
intervals which may create false-positives.
2) Event-series periodicity: Given an event-series Tc re-
lated to client c, we define the proper period of activity as its
period when Tc is treated as a time-series. Then, assuming that
Tc is ordered according to the time-stamps of its events, we
calculate its proper period of activity based on the algorithm
presented in [22]. Since internal auditors are interested in
events that appear on monthly basis, the system evaluates the
severity of the event-series as follows:
High Severity Class: Event-series with period p such that
of 27 ≤ p ≤ 30 or 31 days.
Medium Severity Class: Event-series with period p such
that of 20 ≤ p < 27 days.
Low Severity Class: All other cases.
As previously, the auditor can adjust the values that deter-
mine the intervals for each of the above classes.
3) Events Occurring Outside Working Hours: Given an
event-series related to a particular client, the system tries
to detect suspicious cases occurred within a day. Events of
high-severity are the ones that occur outside the employee’s
working hours, on weekends or holidays. Furthermore, events
of medium-severity are considered those that occur at the
end of the employee’s shift. We have assumed that this case
corresponds to the last two hours of employee’s shift. However,
this value can be appropriately adjusted by the auditor. The
system takes as an input the working hours of each employee
and also takes into consideration weekends and holidays. The
classification of a client based on the time-stamps of the related
events is performed as follows:
High Severity Class: There exists at least one event
occurred outside working hours, on weekends or holidays.
Medium Severity Class: There exists at least two events at the
end of employees’ shift. As previously, the system requires at
least two such events to include an event-series in this class
in order to minimize false-positives. Low Severity Class: All
other cases.
Again, the auditor can appropriately adjust the values that
define the above classes.
4) Number of Employees related to a Client: This factor
indicates the number of employees that are related to a specific
client. Normally, it is expected that distinct events are related
to several distinct employees. Due to the fact that, usually a
randomly selected employee handles a client request, having
the same employee handling multiple requests of the same
client may be an indication of fraud. The classification of
the event-series related to client c based on this factor, is the
following:
High Severity Class: One employee handles more than 50%
of the events related to client c.
Medium Severity Class: Two or three employees handle
more than 50% of the events related to client c.
Low Severity Class: All other cases.
The auditor can also adjust the percentages that define
the above classes. However, there may exist cases where for
instance, a client calls the company for an issue regarding
his/her account and always asks for the same employee. This
obviously, does not consist fraud and the system would provide
a false-positive if this factor was the only factor applied for
ranking. Hence, it is recommended to be applied in conjunction
with other factors.
5) Action Name: Each company has its own rules regarding
the employees that use the business systems and supports
different privileges for different employees. Hence, there ex-
ists a list of actions that may be forbidden for all or for
unauthorized employees. In addition, there exist actions which
are suspicious, even though an employee may be authorized
to perform. Furthermore, there exist actions that may be
correlated (e.g., open-close action) and it is uncommon if one
of them does not appear in the event-series. Thus, since there
exist several rules in order to detect fraud in diverse business
systems, the auditor in our implementation has to adjust the
rules of each severity class on the corresponding panel of the
system. An overview of the classification based on this factor
is the following:
High Severity Class: Actions that are forbidden for unau-
thorized employees.
Medium Severity Class: Actions that are considered to be
suspicious, as described above.
Low Severity Class: All other actions.
6) Client Status: When ranking a client, it is important to
take into consideration its corresponding background history.
This implies that a client for which there existed evidence of
fraud will be ranked higher. The auditor is able to mark a client
as (i) blacklisted, if a previous investigation led to evidence of
fraud, (ii) suspect, if a previous investigation is ongoing or
unresolved, or (iii) cleared, if suspicions of fraud either do not
existed in the system or were not confirmed. According to this
marking, we define the following classification:
High Severity Class: The client is blacklisted.
Medium Severity Class: The client is a suspect.
Low Severity Class: The client is cleared.
B. Employee Ranking
As mentioned in Section III, the system ranks the employ-
ees based on several aspects of their relation with their clients.
Consider an arbitrary employee u and let Su be the set of
clients that are served by employee u, i.e., Su = {c : ∃ event e=
(t,u,c,a)}. Let also Ru = {Rc : c ∈ Su} be the set containing
the rankings of these clients. By default, the system assigns
to the employee the value that corresponds to the maximum
ranking of set Ru. This implies that if an employee is related
to a “suspicious” client, then he/she will be also considered as
“suspicious”. An alternative could be to consider the clients
with rankings greater than a threshold defined by the auditor.
V. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section we describe in detail our fraud detection
system. The system operates in two modes, either off-line or
semi-online. In brief, in the off-line mode the system parses
static data concerning a period of time (e.g., the data of a
week) and provides corresponding visualizations. The semi-
online mode can be used on a daily basis in order to visualize
the daily activity of the employees and clients. In both modes,
the system provides interactive visualizations that help in the
detection of suspicious events. Visualizations of large data-
sets may not be useful in certain cases. To cope with this
problem, the auditor is able to specify a time-window and
then, the system visualizes events whose time-stamp belongs
to the query window. However, ranking can be estimated either
based on the whole data-set that includes data from a much
longer period of time or on data occurring in the specific time
window, according to the specifications of the auditor.
A. Off-line mode
As mentioned in Section I, the system consists of multiple
coordinated views and each of them visualizes a different
aspect of the audit-data.
1) The spiral visualization: A snapshot of the system in
off-line mode is illustrated in Figure 2. In the spiral visual-
ization, each spiral branch visualizes a period of one month,
while the number of spiral branches is related to the first and
last time-stamp of the input data (if not alternatively selected
by the auditor), starting from the first month that coincides
with the inner branch of the spiral. Each spiral branch is split
by a number of lines according to the periodicity value that
is examined (i.e., 7 days, 15 days, 30 days, etc.) and each
line corresponds to a day of a month. The default value is 30
days, which implies that the administrator seeks for monthly
suspicious activity (see Figure 2).
Fig. 2. The main visualization when the system operates in off-line mode.
In the spiral window we place nodes, where each node
represents an event related to a client and its position is
determined based on the corresponding time-stamp. Nodes of
different colors represent events related to different clients. To
produce the spiral visualization, the system ignores multiple
appearances of events that correspond to the same pair of
employee-client at the same date. According to the spiral
structure, events related to the same client and appearing along
a radius of a spiral are considered suspicious and need to
be further examined. However, examining cases of fraud has
revealed that suspicious events may not always appear on the
same date from month to month, and thus, suspicious events
may appear on close radii. These should also be considered as
suspicious.
Employees and clients will be ranked according to the spec-
ifications of the auditor and the ranking function mentioned in
Section IV. Based on the ranking, the system generates a video
file in which each frame depicts the activity of a client within
the specified time interval, giving priority to the ones with
the higher ranking. The ordering of the frames guarantees that
clients that are considered to be suspicious will not be skipped
during processing; even in cases of large data sets they will
be immediately distinguished.
The auditor is able to pause the video in order to further
investigate the activity of a client. By default, on each frame
the billing and the due date of the corresponding client are
depicted on the visualization (see Figure 2). The light-gray
colored region of Figure 2 corresponds to the “dangerous”
interval of a week before the billing date. The red-colored
region of Figure 2 indicates that there exist events from
month to month that differ by less than 3 days. If necessary,
the auditor is able to visualize nodes that involve the same
employee by the same color. By these features, the auditor
quickly identifies events that occur close to the billing/due date
and potential periodic patterns for a specific client.
Filtering techniques are also supported by the system. The
ranking factors described in Section IV can also be used as
filters while the results can be exported in separate log files.
For instance, from a single frame, the auditor can select only
the nodes representing events occurred outside the employee’s
working hours. The auditor can also perform custom queries
to the database which is a fundamental functionality for fraud
detection. Optionally, the system is able to save a produced
visualization in a file for the case where post-processing is
required. It also maintains records about the employees/clients
activities and their ranking.
As already mentioned, by default, the ordering of the
frames is based on the ranking assignment. However, the nodes
of the visualization can be distributed on the frames according
to an ordering specified by the auditor, which may be based
on predefined knowledge about a client or on a list of clients
already marked by the auditor from a previous investigation.
2) Supplementary visualizations: We proceed to describe
the supplementary visualizations of the system. Figure 3 de-
picts a 2-layer visualization representing the total employee-
client activity of the input data. The upper layer corresponds
to distinct employees, while the bottom one to distinct clients.
The ordering of the clients at the bottom layer is according to
their ranking assignment. The node coloring follows the one
used for each client in the spiral visualization. This visualiza-
tion contributes to quickly identify pairs of employees-clients
that appear to be involved in many events and simultaneously
gives an overview of the total activity of the entities. Also,
it demonstrates employees involved with many “suspicious”
clients. The visualization interacts with the spiral drawing
such that when a pair of employee-client is selected from the
spiral drawing, it is also, marked in the layered visualization,
and vice-versa. In the case where there exist more that one
event related to the same pair of employee-client the thickness
of the corresponding edge becomes larger. Optionally, the
visualization can be filtered such that only the client that is
displayed in the video along with its related employees is
visualized.
Fig. 3. A 2-layered visualization representing the total activity of employees
and clients.
In the visualization depicted in Figure 4, the event-series
related to a specified client is represented by a line-graph. Each
node of the drawing corresponds to the day of occurrence
of an event. Each such node is split into time intervals that
correspond to the hours of the day. The middle part (refer to
the pink-colored region of Figure 4) corresponds to the end
of the shift of the employee (i.e., two last hours of the shift).
The upper part (refer to the yellow-colored region of Figure 4)
corresponds to the employee’s time-shift having excluded the
last two hours of the shift, while the bottom part (refer to red-
colored regions of Figure 4) to non-working hours of a day.
The endpoints of an edge touch the parts that correspond to the
time-stamp of the events. Note that for the spiral visualization
the system ignores multiple events that correspond to the same
pair of employee-client. For the visualization of Figure 4, in
the case where multiple events for the same pair of employee-
client occur within a day, multiple nodes will be drawn and will
be bounded by a rectangle in order to be distinguished. The
system optionally takes as an input the shifts for each employee
and makes the proper adjustments to the visualization. Also,
since weekends and holidays can be taken under consideration
by the system, if such cases occur the corresponding nodes
are entirely colored in red (refer to the red-colored node of
Figure 4).
Fig. 4. A visualization that depicts an event-series related to a client and
distinguishes the time that an event occurs within a day. Dates are represented
by yyyy-MM-dd for confidentiality reasons.
Given the event-series of a client, the system provides a
plot where each point (x,y) represents the day y of the period
interval that event x occurred (see Figure 5). Then, using the
least squares method [28], the line that best fits to the data-
set is calculated and plotted. Cases where the slope of the line
tends to zero (i.e, almost parallel to x-axis) and points are close
to the line (the model fits well to the point-set) indicate that
most of the events appear close to the same day of the month.
This implies that there exists a “suspicious” periodic pattern
(e.g., close to day 15). Studying the least-square plot, we have
to take into consideration cases where the calculated line is
“almost” parallel to x-axis but, the points are not close to it.
In this case, the impression of the periodicity is fictionally,
since the line does not fit well to the point-set. However, these
cases can be distinguished quickly either visually or by taking
into consideration the least-square model error.
Fig. 5. A least-square plot that indicates whether there exist periodic events
within a time interval.
Note that, all the above visualizations are updated while the
video frames change. This ensures that the auditor has a full
view of the activity of each client without changing screens or
drawbacks. A supplementary panel, as the one at the left-most
part of Figure 1, demonstrates the database records related
to the client in textual form such that the auditor does not
have to recall database records in order to see the initial input.
The panel also, interacts with the spiral visualization such that
when selecting a node from the spiral the corresponding event
in the panel is selected and vice-versa.
Fig. 6. Client ranking based on 5 factors. Ten most highly-ranked clients are
presented.
Another feature of the system is that it provides a stacked
bar plot demonstrating the ranking of the clients as illustrated
in Figure 6. Each bar corresponds to a client and is split
into regions that represent each of the factors used for client
ranking, while their lengths are proportional to the perfor-
mance of the client on this factor. Also, in each of these
regions the performance of the client on this factor (i.e., 0,
1, or 2) is illustrated. The plot of Figure 6, demonstrates the
ten highly-ranked clients based on five factors. The first bar
indicates that Client-26 was in the High-Severity Class (refer
to Section IV) to three out of the five factors calculated, since
client’s performance was 2 on Factors 1, 3 and 4.
Fig. 7. Different shapes correspond to events generated from different
business systems. Their combination in the visualization reveals the periodic
activity and probably fraud.
Feedback provided by internal auditors added to our system
another important functionality when searching for fraud.
Sometimes, in order to detect fraud it is necessary to trace
suspicious events to more than one business systems. For
this reason, the auditor is able to select a client and load its
activity from more than one such systems. In this case, the
nodes of the visualization are drawn with different shape. In
the visualization of Figure 7, rectangular nodes correspond to
a business system, say A. In the case where circular nodes
corresponding to a different system, say B, are loaded to the
visualization, our suspicions on periodic patterns are much
more justified.
The system also provides an unfiltered view of the pro-
cessed data, as illustrated in Figure 8. Colored nodes corre-
spond to ten highly-ranked clients. Nodes that correspond to
the same client will be represented by the same color. However,
since it is difficult to distinguish suspicious behavior in such
visualizations the system optionally draws a line that best fits
to the activity of the selected client. Filtering techniques like
the ones mentioned above are also supported. By default, the
visualization is filtered such that clients related to only one
event are excluded.
B. Semi-online mode
When developing the system we have tried to incorporate
functionalities for processing dynamic data. However, it would
be impossible in real conditions to continuously have an audi-
tor monitoring the company’s activity. Feedback provided by
internal auditors also discouraged us, since fraud analysis takes
place on a system different than the operational system which
generates log records. For these reasons, we have developed
functionalities for processing the data daily as soon as they are
generated by the systems.
The main visualization of the semi-online mode is again
a spiral and all visualization features are similar to the cor-
responding ones of the off-line mode (refer to Figure 9). In
Fig. 8. Spiral visualization when data are visualized without filtering.
contrast to the off-line, in semi-online mode, the inner branch
of the spiral corresponds to the events of current day. The other
branches coincide to the first and last month of the input data.
The spiral is split by lines representing the days of a month.
In order to produce the visualization, the system re-ranks both
the clients and employees based on the whole data-set (i.e.,
including both previous and new records) and defines their
ordering in the video frames. In semi-online mode, each client
related to an event is visualized at the appropriate position
according to its time-stamp on the inner branch along with all
previous events related to that client. Again, the auditor seeks
for events that appear along a radius or on close radii of the
spiral. This visualization facilitates the immediate detection of
a periodic pattern that may have just begun.
Fig. 9. Spiral visualization when the system operates at semi-online mode.
VI. CASE STUDY
In this section, we present a case study on real data
from a major Greek company (the company name cannot be
revealed due to a nondisclosure agreement). For confidentiality
reasons, the data presented in this case study were prepro-
cessed and made anonymous. The data-set which we processed
corresponds to a time interval of six months and consists of
approximately 35.000 entries involving 7200 distinct clients
and 14 employees stemming from a single fraud management
system of the company. Note that the data from most of the
fraud management systems of the company include sensitive
personal data and we were not allowed to process them for
the purposes of our case study. The case study was performed
while the system operated in off-line mode and without taking
into consideration any prior client or employee ranking.
Since the case study was conducted in collaboration with
the fraud experts of the company, the main question raised by
them was to identify pairs of employee-client that appear to
have more than ten events during the last six months, i.e., the
time-interval of the data-set. In order to become familiar with
the data-set, we first ranked the clients based on the number of
their events. The system identified 430 clients whose number
of related events is larger than ten (about 6% of the number of
clients in the initial data-set) and distributed them accordingly
in the video frames. Even though this number is much smaller
with respect to the total number of clients in the data-set,
the investigation was still a hard task for the auditor (due to
the number of clients to be examined). In the next step, we
performed a second ranking (as described in Section IV) on
the clients based on three factors: (i) the number of events
related to a client, (ii) the number of actions that are highly
unlikely to appear and are indications of possible fraudulent
activity, and (iii) the number of distinct employees serving
the client. Precise details on the configuration values of each
ranking factor are omitted due to a nondisclosure agreement.
Also, since we were not communicated the information about
the billing date of each client and the employees’ shifts we
had to ignore these ranking factors.
The ranking procedure distinguished 52 out of 430 clients
(about 0.7% of the number of clients in the initial data-set) that
were highly-ranked in the above factors and presented them in
the first frames of the video. In the next frames, the system
presented 62 clients (about 0.9% of the number of clients in the
initial data-set) that were medium-ranked in the above factors.
The results were further investigated by the auditors who tried
to detect periodic patterns (daily or monthly) in the specific
frames. The auditors also suggested to apply the periodicity
factor described in Section IV-A2 in order to detect events that
appear within a time interval of (i) 28 days and (ii) 5 days.
For the first case, the system identified 3 out of 52 clients
that were highly-ranked and 6 out of 62 clients that were
medium-ranked. For the second case, 11 out of 52 highly-
ranked clients and 12 out of 62 medium-ranked clients were
identified. For the final step of the investigation, the auditors
used the supplementary visualizations and the log viewer of the
system along with their experience and supplementary data that
were not communicated to us in order to evaluate the severity
of these events. It should be emphasized that the real-time
investigation of the data performed by the auditors (i.e., the
non-automated log file processing) did not identify any of these
reoccurring activity. The results were taken into consideration
by the auditors for further internal investigation.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper proposes a system that aims to detect occupa-
tional fraud in business systems in which a pair of entities,
such as employee-client are involved (e.g., billings systems,
membership renewal system, etc). The system operates in off-
line and semi-online mode. The main visualization consists
of a spiral axis on which the data are mapped to a specific
position according to the time they occur. Periodic events that
appear to a radius of the spiral or on radii close to each other,
are suspicious and need to be further examined. Our work is
on-going and opens several directions for future work:
• Regarding the ranking function, more factors have to
be taken into consideration in order to produce a more
accurate value.
• It would be better for the auditor to add custom
factors and define the appropriate functions through
the graphical user interface of the system.
• Incorporating more functionality that may be useful
for an administrator such as statistic analysis of the
activity for each entity, plots, bar charts, etc.
• It will be of interest to search for groups of col-
laborating employees/clients that may be involved
in suspicious events, performing different clustering
techniques.
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